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GOD KNOWN BY INTUITION

A Study of Edouard Le Roy's "Le Probleme de Dieu."

by

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I. INTRODUCTION.

The following is an attempt to set forth the point of view taken by Professor Edouard Le Roy in his "Le Probleme de Dieu" published by L' Artisan Du Livre,2, Rue De Fleurus, Paris in 1929.

Edouard Le Roy has been a well known disciple of the French philosopher, Henri Bergson for many years, and, when the latter retired, succeeded him in his chair of philosophy in the College of France. In religious affiliation, Le Roy is a Roman Catholic.

II: METHOD FOR THE STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF GOD.

1: Meaning of the Affirmation of God and of personality in God.

Essentially, for one to make his end the sense of perfection, and to orient one's life toward the higher is to affirm God, and to admit that God acts upon us in the guise of a person, is to affirm his personality.

2: NO ATHEISTS.

In a sense, it will be seen, there are no atheists. There are none who will claim that they have arrived where they want to be. All have some ideal toward which they strive. A persistent unrest, an infinite aspiration, the vital attempt to attain this more, is essentially and at its origin faith in God, for the absolutely atheistic soul would not search thus. However while, in this sense, there are no atheists, some do not clearly see their own faith.

Strangely enough, certain formulas of apparent atheism are in reality the affirmation of God. The atheist, in name is often rebelling, not against God himself, but against some misrepresentation of God, repugnant to his reason, and often in itself a denial of the reality of God. This type of nominal atheist loves Truth and Good-

ness, and puts his love into practice by resisting not God, but a demon.

We often see men, who believe that they do not believe in God, who, when evil and death enter their homes, say: "It is law, nature, the order of the Universe," and then bow their heads, and accept what providence gives them without a murmur. When we look into their reasons for refusing God, we find uniquely, the concepts and images, which always signify their profound adhesion to the reality of God.

3: REAL ATHEISM:

However there are real atheists. These are ones, who, whether they say God or not, have a trouble, not with their understanding of what God truly means, as have the nominal atheists spoken of above, but a trouble with their wills. Real atheists are those that resist the inner voice of conscience. Faith in God, as we have defined it, is the substance of the moral life and its inspiring aim. Atheism is immorality. Thus, there are no absolute atheists, but only atheists in intention. Each one of us practices atheism when we do wrong.

4: THE WAY TO GOD.

God is known by a path that contains the whole man,

not merely his intelligence. We know God by turning toward him, and one can know God only in the measure that one turns toward him. Knowledge of Him is be an experience of the inner life. The Classic proofs of God's existence can start the movement of turning toward God, but they can never suffice to find Him. Theoretical speculation finds its value in that it may produce that type of life, into which it best fits.

5: MORAL CERTAINTY.

Leuba has said: "God is not known, he is used." In this regard we must be careful to avoid certain forms of English and American pragmatism in which there is sometimes an attempt to substitute utility for truth. That is not the idea here. Moral certainty does not differ from other types of certainty in degree, but differs in kind. In finding God, evidence and adhesion are reciprocal; a reality of the moral order, which cannot be reached by the senses, cannot be known without accepting it, and then seeing how it influences life. Morality is not measured by intelligence or by knowledge, but by orientation of life, by the intensity of progress.

However it should be noted that one can have a very high and pure moral intuition, and yet its results be vitiated by and because of the very imperfect symbols

which express it. The question is to perceive the primacy of the moral reality. The results must depend upon analysis as well as upon the basic intuition.

Such faith in the primacy of the moral reality or of God is not opposed to reason, a deficient science, or a sentimental or voluntary acceptation of something despite the insufficiency of proof. The most legitimate certitude is always a faith. Where we have no demonstration, properly speaking, faith frees life, so that it can orient itself, to its own proper advantage.

Thus the knowledge of God is the result of an experience had, and not of abstract reasoning. None can come to believe in God solely by the force of logic. Faith in God cannot be imposed brutally from without, nor can an inner experience be brought to those that close their eyes. However, intuition and inner experience are a better proof than would be a speculative demonstration. One knows God through and by the movement of love, which one has for Him. That is why God is better known by the saints then by the geniuses.

6: CONCEPTS OF GOD- THEIR USE:

The intellectual concepts of God, however, do play a large part, in that they concentrate and give direction

to the movement of life with which they deal, and to the power which it generates. However it should always be borne in mind that to grasp a moral reality, the only competent and appropriate agent is an experience, which is moral itself, and that such an experience is always to be judged pragmatically, by its fruits, and not by exactitude of definition. Le Roy adds that it should also be recognized that the religious experience is essentially a traditional and social experience, and that there is a certain solidarity of the human race in life, in death, and in the search for more being in all order.

The proof of God is a matter of the whole life, not of the details fastened upon in the traditional Classic proofs, and we must approach the problem of God upon this basis.

III: THE POINT OF DEPARTURE--HUMAN UNREST.

1: THE PROBLEM OF LIFE.

With the purpose of moving toward a knowledge of God by a process of reflective analysis, which shall directly meet the demands of religion rather than by one of pure theoretical philosophy, Le Roy chooses as his point of departure, the problem of the profound mystery of human life. Where are we going? Upon what can we lay hold? What do we accomplish by our efforts? Where can we place our security? It is a problem in which man is himself the unknown. All men meet this problem.

2: NECESSITY OF SOLVING THIS PROBLEM.

Not only is this a vital problem, which is imposed upon each one of us, and which none can escape. It is also a problem which all men do solve either well or ill. Pascal has already pointed out the folly of indifference, and the strange misery of those who attempt to avoid the problem, for it cannot be evaded. Living is an answer. We may merely choose whether our answer shall be the result of an attempt to search out a reflective response, or whether in place of a well-pondered answer, we are willing to permit chance to give us a chance reply.

Also, our life is a flight toward an unknown mystery, and the fact of death, certain and unknown, forces us to make reply, for we have but one hour of consciousness in which to answer, and then the night cometh, whereof no man knoweth.

3: MAN'S GREATNESS:

Man is very great. We form centers in an universal interaction. We carry within ourselves an abridgment of the entirety of nature. We live, rich in the past of ourselves, and of the race. We sum up all life and all history. Condensed in our natures is all the prodigious effort which precedes us. In ourselves as men, we see a clarity of pure intelligence, free moral agency, even goodness.

4: MAN'S LITTLENESS.

But there is a reverse side to all this glory: man is weak and miserable, and he has no rest. What is man in the two great infinities of space and time? He seems lost in the awful bigness of the modern world, and he also seems ephemeral in the infinity of time. Furthermore the moral indifference of this immensity meets our hearts like the chill of death. We are only an imperceptible point in nature. Of what value and importance then can be our

judgments, our consciousness of value, our dreams, desires, emotions, and our hopes? We are dominated on all sides; an unknown force imposes even our conditions of life upon us. The matter in us commands us, and preys upon our personality and even upon our reason. Finally thought itself seems in us an enemy of that which constitutes our reason for being.

5: THOUGHT - THE BASIS OF OUR GRANDEUR.

Pascal dissipates this mirage of our own absolute littleness, however, by pointing out that still we are more important than these things of great size. Thought is the basis of our grandeur. Even when crushed we know of the universe's victory, and it doesn't. We are the greater. Only in imagination do space and time measure the degree of being, and imagination is always material.

In reality, the heart and thought of man envelope all the universe. Spirit comprehends matter, which is all dependent upon it. Space, and time are actually in thought.

Furthermore, we are more than simple movement and cold knowledge. In us there are such elements of the supernatural such as love, and finally with our thought, we penetrate even our own misery. We become capable of

accepting it, of marking its limits, of giving it a sense and a value. By thought, we become capable of being much greater than the mechanistic universe. We love. We are raised to the dignity of being free moral agents. Thought is the source of our grandeur.

6: THE INADEQUACY OF MAN'S THOUGHTS.

However, man's thought is very inadequate, and has many limitations. All of our science is nothing, but a vacillating light in a vast night of ignorance. We can grasp the exterior facts of our universe, but the complicated interior of phenomena defies all our attempts to capture its meaning. Even the little that we know is much too vast for one human mind to hold. There is no one to synthetize it. Social knowledge falls into numerous errors, and even for the individual thinker, the error of false dialectic lies in wait. We see our own inconsistency. Every human idea contains within itself its negation; every devotion its refusal. If we cultivate an exclusive faculty, we can see only a single aspect of things.

7: INNER DIVISION AND INSTABILITY.

In our own souls, in the personality, the Me, we are a kingdom divided against itself. We seek for ourselves,

and we cannot find. One finds not only inconsistency within oneself, but also flat contradiction. We fall into evil, while detesting it. We always rest between two contraries. Being too great to be merely animals, we cannot place ourselves without exception in the spiritual life. This causes man's unrest. He searches for and wants some interior equilibrium, some harmony of his forces, some direction for all his efforts, some center of interest, which shall give meaning and value to his life. A profound duality divides man. He is at the same time, sensual and rational, individual and social, devoted and selfish, a realist and an idealist, a mixture of matter and of spirit. Generally he is both an enigma and a scandal to himself. He sees himself great by that very thing which also makes him miserable.

8: MAN'S NEED FOR SOMETHING BEYOND.

Man is then so made that he finds in nothing which nature offers him, either within himself or without, a fullness and perfection of reality capable of satisfying all his needs. At the same time great and in misery, man finds himself always an essentially unstable being, always forced by his nature to search for equilibrium. Man always requires something other than what he has, he always finds his limitation, for his is a state, both of greatness and

of distress, the one in the bosom of the other. That is why he always lives in regret over the past, or in hope for the future, never in the present.

9: CLOSE.

History shows this perpetual agitation of mankind. In living, if it be merely random living, man pronounces a judgment of value upon life. We set ourselves a goal. We struggle between necessities and opposing proofs, we choose finally to put into something our joy and our hope. It concerns us not to make this choice blindly, and thus a problem is presented to us, first to define, and then to solve.

IV: THE PROBLEM OF MAN'S DEEPEST DESIRE.

1: MAN'S DESIRE TO BE HAPPY.

The fact of human unrest presents a problem that we must solve. Man must know himself before he can best regulate his life. Now, man wants to be happy and to be good, he wants to be, to live, and especially does he want to be happy. One can conceive of happiness under a selfish form, or under a universal form. One can put his happiness in pleasure, in power, in beauty, in knowledge, in love, in reason, and even in sacrifice; but it is always happiness that he seeks. Man seeks happiness, but unfortunately, he doesn't find it. Something is lacking.

2: THE NEED FOR THE ETERNAL.

Nothing of the present can make man happy. He needs something eternal. Some men are happy; they have found happiness in God, and repose in the source of peace eternal. Others, the worshippers of mediocrity sometimes think that they are happy, but they have not obtained an infallible assurance against the accidents of life. No, unrest and infinite aspiration are essential parts of the truly human life. Man finds and must find something else as the basis of himself. All endeavors to make himself content with his present self fail. With every attempt

he becomes more disquieted and more conscious of the immensity of life that is within him.

Even when man abandons the search for something more and eternal, believing in the impossibility of good, it is only the discouraged renunciation of despair. Man has not yet come to the last ditch in his search and most men do not give up.

3: OTHER ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS.

There have been many solutions attempted, other than that of finding an eternal, but in various ways they have failed, and do fail.

Epicureanism leads to the destruction of life in gross pleasure. It is the principle of death.

Stoicism presupposes a pride that is almost inhuman, and ends in deathly pessimism. While these solutions are not alike to all individuals, they most certainly do not suffice for humanity as a whole. At best, they are based upon but a partial truth.

Again, does man move toward the death of desire in himself? There have been attempts to search for peace by extinction and not by the exaltation of the feeling of personality. However this method cannot be durable, the

suppressed longings rise again. Others attempt to forget Life in life, but this diversion only loses that which is the true basis of humanity.

Some would say that unrest is morbid; that it can very easily be exaggerated. Now, human unrest must not be confounded with pathological "Anxiety." Human unrest belongs to the calmest and most sane of men. The attempts to explain it away as pathological are the signs of pseudo-medicine.

Other attitudes, which are less pretentious, but even more negative, are those of pure indifference. Mediocre souls can be mere lovers of beauty, dilettantes, and sceptics, and be merely amused by those who love the adventure and the risk, and strive manfully to solve the problem. They are too elegant to struggle, but by their very abstention, they do make a judgment of value, for they cannot elude the necessity of acting. So they close their eyes and make their choice blindly. These are the truly poor consciences. The really true men are those others, who have the unrest.

We can be less severe on others, who are more modest and also partially blind; who say that they have no need to see so high in order that they may be honest men, but they likewise are mistaken. The problem still remains;

it is inherent in the human will.

4: VOLITION OR WILL.

At the most intimate basis of human life, we find volition, will, a certain deepest source of desire, an interior illumination that grows bit by bit. This is not, however, an independent faculty. Will is nothing but thought, but it is thought that gives direction, and course, that desires. Desire is a universal fact, and its absence would be equivalent to annihilation. Volition or will is absolutely essential to us.

5: TWO ORDERS OF DESIRE.

Now in experience, we find that we must make a distinction between two orders of volition; there are superficial volitions or desires, and there is a deep and profound volition. It is each man's work to find the deepest and most profound volition in his own soul, to find his "True Volition," "To Become what He Is." There is a first desire, will, volition that is the end of our lives, and whose function it is to inspire us.

The secondary volitions are but particular determinations of our initial volition. Unfortunately, however, a conflict is possible between these two phases of volition. This situation may be due to,

1: ignorance, or accidental error.

2: A mixture of volition with the materiality which constitutes us individuals. We must work to unify ourselves, to raise individuality to personality, to discipline the secondary wills, and cause them to submit to the Deepest and most fundamental will.

6: TWO ORDERS OF THOUGHT AS A WHOLE.

A similar difference to that between the primary volition, and secondary volitions, occurs in the realm of thought as a whole. On the one hand, we have the intuition of creative thought, on the other hand, the analysis of discourse. Generally our intelligence works by analysis, by the dispersion of concepts and a latter combination of the fragments.

But analysis and its operations logically presuppose a life of thought more profound, a greater concentration of spirit. Here also under certain circumstances, the analysis may conflict with the intuition and here also, the intuition is the more primal and valuable.

7: THE FIRST VOLITION AS THE SOURCE OF HUMAN UNREST.

The first and deepest volition, which is the source of our being, shows itself by a conflict within us. There is a contradiction within ourselves, caused by the lack of

full adjustment between it, and our more superficial desires. Thus, it is the cause of human unrest. However it is difficult to disengage the real direction of the deepest volition.

8: THE SUPREMACY OF THE SPIRITUAL.

Now concerning the purely animal and sensory life. It is not the field in which the ends of the Deepest Volition rest, for across sensation and in it, there is something else that we see. (Something which disappears, however, when we analyse it.) We want the good things of life, but in them, the animal life only tries to climb to something higher. The testimony of the human heart is clear. Man is a being who searches and aspires without end. We are already engaged in a gradual liberation, and in an ascension toward the perfect. It is by the indefinite perspective, and by an eternal progress, that we must go to find our good, but merely material and technical progress is not sufficient. It is clear that it does not meet our needs, nor does social life give us the sense and value that satisfies. These are not enough. It is necessary to affirm, that our true destiny as men is our destiny as spirits.

9: MAN'S DEEPEST DESIRE.

Pure knowledge can never alone solve the problem of

human life, because it rests on what man is, and not upon what he ought to be, nor upon what he wants to be, and the most important thing in man is his search for good, a certain impulse or élan toward spiritual perfection. And what we will in the inmost center of us, the root Volition, that is us established in being. To live a human life means always to search for and want the Higher than that which we have. The object of the initial will is not only the other, but the more.

It is possible now to discern the general direction of this more. The spiritual life is the truly human life. Man wants to realize himself as a spirit. In this, consists his humanity. In other words, Man's deepest desire is to grow more fully into a person. We are now ready to pass to the nature of freedom.

10: DEGREES OF PROFUNDITY IN VOLITION.

There is danger that the anology between the deepest volition and secondary volitions on the one hand, and intuition and analysis on the other, may lead us into an error. There are many various intuitions. May there not also be many deepest volitions. One might object: the deep Me is many, it is not one; there is a multiplicity of initial wills. However it is to be noted that this is not the case with intuition itself in reality. The dif-

ferent intuitions are of various depths. There are several degrees of depth in intuition, and there is also a most deep intuition which is one. Likewise the most profound and deepest volition is one, although there are also several degrees of depth in volition. It is the volition that is one. All other volitions belong to the several stages unequally profound.

11: FAITH.

There is an exigence, necessity, requirement to live the spiritual life in man. Faith is the seeing of this requirement to the spiritual life. When we see the motion within, inspiring us, we have an authentic faith. We now have passed from unrest and inquietude to faith; we have the germs of the faith which responds to what the human unrest demands.

It is to obey this faith, to follow the impulsion that it gives us, in accepting in advance all that it requires of us, which properly constitutes the moral life. The moral life requires the struggle between the first volition and the secondary ones, and the search for an interior equilibrium. We have found a solution implicit in the very persistence of the trouble which desoled us. Faith was implicit in human unrest. The next problem is what shall we say of this invincible faith.

V: FAITH IN GOD.

1: CREATION AS A GOAL.

The moral history of man is not solely a matter of unrest. It has another aspect. The sign of the attaining of destination is happiness. Note that it is happiness, and not pleasure. Happiness is the sign of victory in the direction of life. Pleasure is merely an artifice of nature for the conservation of life. Now we discover that happiness comes from creating; the richer the creation, the greater is the happiness. Consider the business man. He gets pleasure as he grows in wealth or in fame; he obtains happiness only when he has built something worth while. Furthermore, glory alone will not give it. There is no true happiness, except that of creating.

In this regard, it is to be noted that the growth of personality is a form of creation. Thus nature orients us toward the ideal of creation in the growth of personality.

Man finds a real enlargment of his personality in liberation and spirituality, in Good, and in Duty. The effort of life to ascend, the struggle for spiritual progress, these are the conditions of truly human life. The Deep will is the principle motive of our life. We search for the beyond of our actual life, and this search is the

essential condition of human progress, and of our maintenance in being.

Man is individual, humanity is collective, but both progress. Human life is both a perpetual infancy, and a great infinity and eternity. These qualities it is that make it human.

2: THE WILL TO CREATE VS. THE WILL TO POWER.

This will to create which gives us the dignity of being truly humans does not coincide with Nietzsche's "Will to Power." That which surrounds us is a requirement of directed creation. The will of Nietzsche is nothing but a parody of will; the mere passionate caprice of the man who does not know himself. What does it profit a man to conquer the whole world, if he loses his own soul.

A man's soul is firstly thought, but it is not thought alone. The science of exterior things do not console one for ignorance of the moral, in times of affliction. The decisive fact is that man, in the inmost depth of his being, wants the achievement of wisdom, and increase in justice and in spiritual perfection. This is the foundation of the only real life, the moral life.

THE PROBLEM OF DUTY.

The discernment of the force of requirement inherent
the first volition would be a partial solving at least
the problem of duty. How can we best solve this pro-
lem of obligation? A true obligation cannot be exterior
secondary, since it presupposes autonomy. Furthermore,
is impossible to prove it by logic, since such an at-
mpt leads to an infinite recession, with the initial
pposition for pure reasoning ever suspended in emptiness.

Therefore the pretense of proving to a man, what he
ught to will is vain. However it is possible to show
im that in fact he does will it, and this can suffice.
he has need for a necessary will, to discern in man what
e wants radically, primordially, inevitably. There is
his volition in man, and to discern this is to resolve
he problem of obligation.

"NECESSARY WILL."

There is an analogy to the case in morality in that
ituation in logic in which we can arrange affirmations
n series, so that if we know by hypothesis one, all are
rue; all are suspended on the initial affirmation, and
tand if there is no doubt as to it. Thus it is with
orality.

In the case of the "I think, therefore I am," Descartes announces in the first phrase an affirmation, which is included in all other possible affirmations. Now if likewise there is one "will" fundamentally inherent in every particular will, this "Necessary will" can furnish a principle of obligation absolutely valuable.

The analysis of consciousness has shown us that there is in us as the basis of life, a need, an aspiration, a requirement to incessant creation, which exigence gives us impulsion and movement, sometimes even in spite of our apparent intentions. This exigence however, does not manifest itself in us in the form of an external and contrary force. It inspires and solicits. In a word, it is the source in us of volition. It is the initial and profound volition, that puts us into being. This generating volition dwells immanent in all our ulterior acts. This fundamental will inspires us. It is oriented in a definite direction. It is the will to progress infinitely in spirituality. It is the moral exigence.

5: TWO ORIENTATIONS OF LIFE.

Man has two lives, an animal life, and a spiritual life. The moral problem bears upon the passage from the one to the other. For man there are two possible orien-

tations of his life,

1: he can rest satisfied in his acquired realizations,

2: or he can search always beyond.

But these two ways are not equally open, and simply proposed to our choice. The first orientation tends toward the destruction of life itself. The second only can reach the End. Here again we meet the problem of obligation.

If we compare these two directions of life, which seem to be offered to our choice, we find that it is the second, the volition of the infinite spiritual life that we install in the first, the purely animal life. It is this that permits us to persevere and to have faith. It is this that gives reality to all our particular desires. We cannot escape its embrace, at least not with durable success, for it represents in each volition the force of volition. Our situation with respect to it is the same as that of our thought in face of the Cogito (I think) of Descartes.

6: OBLIGATION.

This volition is in a sense inevitable and necessary. The deepest volition is first, and the foundation of its prevalence lies in the fact that all subsequent volitions must procede from it, and exist only by its motion. This

primary choice fixes all subsequent choices.

However it is possible for us to attempt to avoid the First Decision by opposing to it our particular volitions. Therefore we speak not of necessity, but of obligation. Our obligation to make this first choice is the foundation of all authentic Duty. Goodness and Duty is the direction of this choice. Evil is the direction reversed to Duty.

7: DUTY AND GOODNESS.

These two problems of Duty and of Good cannot be separated. They are merely two aspects of the same thing, and one in foundation. The idea of duty includes that of good, likewise the idea of good includes that of duty. One might speak of a reciprocal immanence of the two ideas. They are not distinct, but merely two aspects inseparably united, of the same reality, which has two abstract points of view.

This fact of obligation in us acts somewhat like the vital impulse (elan vital) in the universe. It is a creative motion, that inserts us into being. That being is given to us by an impulsation and not as an immobility would give it.

We always find that the fundamental volition is oriented in a definite direction, that of spiritual progress, the sense of movement toward the more and toward the greater being. This is to affirm the universal and primordial supremacy of good.

8: EVIL.

Some have imagined that evil is a simple deficience, a negation, the effect of an error of judgment. However, evil always appears to us as an active and positive reality. It is never absolutely deepest and first. Original good is always more original than original sin, but it makes the secondary volitions work against their own proper tendency. In evil, the secondary volitions are antagonistic to the Primary Volition. It is a matter less of simple contradiction, than (in the rigour of the term) of contra-volition of will against will. That which constitutes the paradox of evil is this return of the will against itself. Evil is more than simple error. However it implies error, and the problem consists in making the theory of error explain malicious evil.

9: FREEDOM.

Man thinks that he is capable of having ideas and that these ideas are the forces which determine his ac-

tions, and conduct of every kind. It is an undeniable fact that we have the power to determine our ideas. We do have in experience a certain freedom of the will.

We now have the necessary elements to make a supreme conclusion.

10: THE MORAL EXIGENCE.

The first exigence is already the underlying principle of even our animal life, and moreover it is by obeying it that we are humans. It is in us, without being of us, or rather we are in it, since it is of it, that we are born as spirits, in it and by it that we become spirits. It precedes us, it puts us into being, it opens to us the ways of our destiny. It is by obeying it, that, little by little, we realize ourselves, and we have need of the impulsion, which it gives to us. It presents itself to us as a veritable reality, and moreover, it is in us the testimony and action of a veritable reality, or perhaps we may better say of something Super-Real. In this sovereign reality, we are in fellowship with all, for it is the same exigence which wills in you and in me, and both of our personalities are born of it. Also it places in us, at the center of our beings, in the inmost and deepest recesses of our souls a certain principle of

spiritual community. It is this that animates all of our particular volitions. It is then in us, immanent in all our acts as their secret soul, or rather we are in it and by it, which to us is more interior than ourselves. It is a creative exigence, absolute, since it is the principle of all relation, and of all modality.

11: THE AFFIRMATION OF GOD.

The analysis of consciousness shows us than at the innermost part of us, in the center of our nature, as the source of being in us, a first and sovereign exigence of endless progress toward the perfect spiritual life. Now this affirmation of the primacy of the Moral exigence is the affirmation of God. Notice, that Le Roy does not say that the affirmation of God deduces itself as a necessary consequence of the affirmation of the moral antecedence. He does say that these are two affirmations which are not distinct, which are but one. There is no change in the meaning of language here. Pascal has already said that the true God is not simply an exterior one of geometrical verities, and of the order of elements, but the true God is one who makes the soul feel that He is its unique good, and that it can find peace only by loving Him.

Thus Le Roy says that he has not proven that one ought to believe in God. He has merely demonstrated that

actually one does so believe. There can be no proof of God by external material objects. The knowledge of God is the fruit of a moral experience,,and not of abstract reasoning, nor of a proof by the senses.

In aquiring the germ of faith in God, it is necessary for each to recognize as a fact of his interior history, that he affirms God by the act even of living, and that this affirmation is immanent in all vital effort.

In this regard, one can never insert into a soul from without a faith of which it is entirely destitute. The problem is to show the soul, which ignores it, the germ of faith which already lives obscurely in it, and to make it take consciousness of its own deeper state.

12: FAITH.

Faith is not a mere intellectual adhesion to a list of theorems, or to a catalogue of facts. It is a unitive manner of walking, to which the soul gives the entirety of itself. Furthermore, faith is not an inferior type of knowledge, nor an emotional or willed acceptance of anything, despite the insufficiency of proof for it. It is not a simple conjecture, subjectively probable, nor a condition with no support; but it is the discerning of an exigence to the spiritual life, of an inspiring motion

within. Faith can be thought of as having three elements.

1: It is the recognition or perception of a fact of the order of the universe, of a fact given in life itself, that of the existence of this moral exigence.

2: It is the consenting to follow this inspiring motion within.

3: Finally, it is the affirming, after reflection, that this attitude of being willing to follow the moral exigence, is not deceived. There is a certain confidence inherent in faith.

It is well for God to appear as the object of faith, since it is as the creative exigence of the spiritual life that we discern him. However, here, we are only speaking of nascent faith. This faith cannot be illusory, since it is implicated indissolubly in the fact even of life. The affirmation, which this faith envelopes must necessarily be true, since this affirmation finds itself implicit as principle of possibility in every act of thought or of will.

13: OBSCURITY OF THE FAITH IN GOD.

But if the faith in God is certainly not illusory, it is, nevertheless very obscure. God is largely a mysterious unknown. There is an element of confidence in-

herent in all faith. We only know God in effect as the source which gives us our proper origin of consciousness, and of realization. We know Him in, and by the relationship which unites us to Him. The exigence or motion, seem as the principle and center of the deepest volition, marks the point of our insertion in God, and it is here that we know Him. However we know Him but very imperfectly.

VI: THE PRELIMINARY AFFIRMATIONS.

1: THE NEED FOR PHILOSOPHIC FUNDAMENTALS.

We feel a need of submitting to results obtained by the examination of consciousness to a test of verification, which is properly rational. This is the work, which we are now going to undertake.

Now faith in God is not dependent upon any particular philosophy. Historically, philosophy properly speaking has played merely a secondary and tardy role in the evolution of religion. Religion belongs to all; it is not reserved to any elite intellectual group.

But the religious affirmation does presuppose a certain atmosphere of thought. There are certain preliminary philosophical affirmations essential to the religious affirmation.

Everyone has a philosophy. Philosophy is not necessarily obscure. The idea that it is, has arisen from a confusing of the two types or functions of philosophy.

1: Philosophy deals with given ideas, the immediate and fundamental products of consciousness, possessed by all honest men.

2: Certain forms of philosophy are an attempt to get

away from the philosophic fundamentals, spoken of above. It is this type of philosophy, which has given philosophy its reputation of obscurity.

Men must have a philosophy of the first type for life and thought; that is, they must have some conception of life, some doctrine of destiny. They must have these given philosophic fundamentals.

2: THE EXISTENCE OF A SPIRITUAL REALITY.

The first of these given philosophic fundamentals is the existence of a spiritual reality. Consciousness and thought in us are the objects of an irresistible and permanent faith. These are known by a process different from that of objective observation used in science, by an intimate feeling, and in an inner illumination. They can best be approached by the subjective method. The ensemble of facts revealed by a look into our own interior include spiritual reality in thought, and otherwise. The existence of this reality is something truly evident, for it is something indissolubly mixed with all. We can feel or think or do. It is by it, and in it, and across it, that everything else exists for us, and that we exist in our own eyes.

3: FREEDOM.

The second of these preliminary affirmations is that

of human freedom. The problem of freedom is in effect one with that of action. It consists essentially in asking oneself if there are any things which depend upon us, if we are really capable of action, or if our action is a pure illusion. Freedom is the faculty of action; action is true being, not merely as an organ or vehicle, but as origin, principle, the force producing. Action is not then in basis another thing from free action. All true action is free. The problem of free action is not more restricted or more particular than the problem of the act in itself.

Furthermore, this problem of freedom is one with that of our existence, and of our reality. Am I "Me" or am I not? It is a question of knowing whether my actions are mine and of me, or on the contrary whether that which seems to come from me as its source is in reality occassioned from without. Does that which I call Me exist truly in the condition of being more than merely a center of convergence in the universal interaction? Either my existence is just a word or I am a source of creative spontaneity, and then since I am also a thought process, I become a free agent.

It is not necessary here to enter into all the subtle metaphysics of the philosopher. For the purpose of relig-

ion it is not necessary to solve all speculative difficulties. Many of them disappear, when we think of the universe as it truly is, as a moving process rather than a static, but we need not go into that.

We believe ourselves to be free.

1: We believe in our capacity to pay attention, when and where we will, to evoke, and to affirm an idea.

2: We also believe in the efficacy of our intellectual affirmation.

Finally, to deny the fact of human freedom is equivalent to denying that the human spirit is capable of invention. However a human idea is, at least to some degree, an effect of creative initiative and not entirely the prodyct if exteruir firces.

4: LIFE AND DIRECTION.

Life is a tendency, an effort, a struggle of invention. It adapts itself, and changes. Life is oriented in a certain sense toward an ever clearer consciousness, and an ever richer action. It has direction. It is striving for a more differentialted nervous system, and a more developed mind. It includes choices, judgments of preference, the distinction between good and evil. Man is capable of invention. The Idea plays an undeniable

role in the efficacious determination of conduct.

Before man, the ascension of life was by instinctive spontaneity. In man, it is by consciousness become explicit, by the aptitude of conceiving an idea, the redoubtable faculty hence forth acquired to criticize and judge the real, to accept or refuse an effort.

It has often been supposed that the vital impulse of the universe (the élan vital) and the spiritual life are opposed as having inverse orientations. The vital impulse has been thought of, as a brutal volition of expansion and power, while the spiritual life has been supposed to inspire ideals of love, justice, and purity. This placing of the vital impulse and the spiritual impulse in opposition is wholly artificial. It is the result of an artificial abstraction. The spiritual life merely prolongs the vital impulse. They are merely two parts of the same thing or rather the same reality seen in two aspects. Man has moral quality. Rightly understood, life and natural law also include man.

5: THE MORAL PROBLEM.

We are now arrived at the full reign of consciousness. The next problem is to define the form and tendency of life. In what essentially, consists the moral problem?

The answer is that the moral problem is the problem of the nature and destiny of man. It is the problem of the orientation of our life. It is the problem of good and evil, of the highest principle of order in this world, and furthermore it is a strangely imperious problem, one from which no man escapes. It is unavoidable, installed in advance in the inmost part of us by the sole fact of our insertion into life. We cannot avoid having to solve it.

We must consult also the community sense in order clearly to see and understand this problem of action, for there are three forms or degrees of this problem:

1: We do not live in a state of isolation, or of solitude. We have mutual relationships. Therefore the moral problem is a question of social concert.

2: We find within us a plurality of divergent tendencies. It is necessary for us to choose among them, and to subordinate the less important and valuable. This is also part of the moral problem.

3: We need a Regulating Principle, a regulating norm which furnishes a standard of appreciation and of conduct. The moral problem has to do with an End, or Ideal which shall give a pole of convergance for our actions and life. The moral problem is one of the community sense. It is a problem of establishing a program of life and of justifying it.

6: TWO ASPECTS OF LIFE.

Human reality appears under two distinct aspects.

1: As matter, with its laws of mechanism, i.e., as given external phenomena, man perceives this as object.

2: As consciousness, as the inner life of spiritual liberty. Man perceives this as subject. The essential question of morality, which one merely sees under the viewpoint of conduct, is that of the adjustment of these two aspects of human life. The moral question consists in effect in solving the question of whether we have only one nature, only one possibility of evolution opened before us, or whether we really have two.

Now it is undeniable that man seems double, and experience, as the critical discussion and analysis of doctrines confirms in him this feeling of duality. His existence has two faces, that of object as an exterior existence, and as subject, an interior existence. His life has two cycles, the animal life and the spiritual life.

However are not reason, thought, spirit, the qualities of the second nature superior and even infinitely superior in value and dignity to those of the merely animal life? This is the moral problem. We must now consider a new aspect of this question.

7: VALUE JUDGMENTS.

We not only pronounce upon things, beings, and acts, judgments of existence, we also pronounce judgments of value. These value judgments seem to have objectivity, to have truth, independent of our feelings. They are not less inevitable than those of existence, They are a part of our life. It is impossible to elude these judgments of value for the very attempt to refuse to decide them is again a manner of action, an effective judgment of value. We can act without reflection or consciousness. We cannot refuse to act. The alternative is to have or not to have the light of consciousness reflected in the judgments which we can never avoid.

Even from the point of view of "value," the order of the true does not confound itself with that of the good. There are two orders of judgment. The judgment of exigence or of requirement put forth dynamically an end, an ideal. They declare, not what we are, but what we ought to be. By their intervention a judgment of value becomes possible between the judgments of value themselves.

8: THE KINGDOM OF ENDS.

The decisive point in the position of the moral problem is the fact of obligation. There are some judgments that are hypothetical and conditional. Some ends are al-

ways facultative and arbitrary. However the case is entirely different with moral prescriptiona, and principally with the supreme rule that governs them. There are all kinds of ends, absolute ends, and practical ends, technical rules, and moral rules, there are also intermediate ends or rules. Moral progress lies in the rising from the lower ends to the higher. But both kinds are requisite for defining in its plenitude the moral reality.

How can we construct an adequate doctrine of ends? A physics of moral facts can never solve this question, for an authentic moral philosophy must be far different in nature from a physical science. For it we must verify an absolute need, we must remain in the domain of pure constants, and an analytical philosophy can never pass beyond the conditional.

Therefore it is not possible to impose ends. But it is possible to discover what is wanted by men, and this suffices to give a solution to the problem, the only solution that plainly satisfies its requisite conditions.

The requirement to the spiritual life, and to endless faith in this properly human life presents a requirement of this character. Man does desire to grow spiritually.

9: HUMAN UNREST AGAIN.

But such conduct can never belong to man, without ceaseless conflict with the tendencies toward selfishness and toward laziness. This battle in its turn, puts in him a trouble, and it is even in this trouble that he forst becomes conscious of his Deepest Volition. Thus we have gone back again to human unrest. All other paths will lead to this; we cannot escape it. Human Unrest is at the heart of all other facts. It is because these other facts contain that of Human Unrest that they can be adopted as bases of support and sources of impulsion. Human Unrest is not only a point of departure. It is the point of departure.

10: IMMORTALITY.

If our spiritual conduct were definitely closed by death, the Need immanent in the fact of Human Unrest would become less pressing.

However there are reasons for which, in spite of our ignorance as to how, we are forced to believe that the horizon of our conduct goes beyond this world.

On a basis of Bergsonian philosophy, the mental life transcends the life of the brain, and if the mental life

does transcend the life of the physical brain, then survival after death becomes so reasonable that the obligation to prove their point rests hence forth on those who negate immortality rather than upon those who affirm it.

The advantage now lies with those who affirm that the fact of an instinct for immortality and of certain considerations of the moral order prove survival. This proof rests however upon a thoroughly academic philosophy.

Another objection, besides the one of the necessity of physical action in the brain for thought, has been one which affirmed that spirit requires matter, that the body is a necessary instrument of precision. Thought must be tested by facts, and how can we conceive of a true survival, with the body gone, and therefore with the cessation of all possibility of acting. The answer to this is: This objection rests upon an analysis of the conditions imposed upon the exercise of consciousness in the present order of life. Now there is an inherent illusion in all attempts to conceive the future life as a continuation of our earthly life. If the instinct of survival has any value, it is as an instinct of metamorphosis, and metamorphosis is necessary to explain it.

11: THE BODY.

It is possible to confirm and augment the force of

this response by a reflection of another kind. All materiality is nothing, but dead thought, thought run down. By consequence, the body in its present estate is in us that which limits the spirit, thought; it is its diminution and loss of value; it is not its principle. The detachment is here as always nothing but a means of purification and of liberation. As behind the analysis of the savant there lies intuition, similarly behind the body there lies thought. The necessity of a body is nothing but an element of this part of our passage; it marks only a phase of belief or of maturation.

12: IMMORTALITY AND SCIENCE.

Now if we abandon the field of philosophy and turn to science we find that it is not permissable to pick and choose among the facts presented to us. We may not decree a choice between the characters of man, retain those of the physical order, and neglect those of the moral order. The absurd is the supreme law of things. Science attacks spirit only to dissolve its own proper point of departure. Then it has devoured itself.

13: IMMORTALITY AND ASPIRATION.

A difficulty can perhaps be produced here, relative to the manner of defining and comprehending the fact of unsatisfied aspiration. There seems to be a prodigality

of life, a formidable multitude of individual sacrifices, an astronomical number of attempts to achieve. These facts seemingly present a general law. For man, aspiration becomes a Need for that which offers the properly moral significance, and par excellence for the deepest Volition, that is to say the infinite desire in the spiritual direction.

Here we have evidence comparable to that of the Cogito (Ithink) of Descartes. All existence is dependent upon thought, all thought breathes in an atmosphere of moral Need, and this makes implicit the affirmation of immortality.

Finally, although the mystery remains, the obstacles are separated from our path. All is ready for an intellectual verification of the faith in God.

Immortality plays no part in that proof. It is merely probable. The sole import here is the impossibility of negating it.

VII: THE AFFIRMATION OF GOD.

1: THREE SEPARATE IDEAS OF GOD.

The fact, that our inner life seen under its moral aspect, implicates necessarily faith in God, has been placed beyond doubt. However one might perhaps think that we are going too rapidly; that the word God, so promptly adopted, says much more than it is as yet permissible to affirm. What shall be our attitude toward such a situation? Shall it be one purely expectant and critical?

Now there are several ideas in that of God, as has been shown historically by M. Belot. These are:

1: The popular and anthropomorphic God: He is the product of the primitive gods, and is the object of the collective imagination. He is the symbol and factor, or rather of center of the social unity.

2: The God of philosophy, attained by reflection upon the origin and foundation of things, or upon the possibility of knowing them. This God is the first principle of existence and the center of the intellectual unity.

3: The Moral God: Known by an experience of the inner life, with Whom one seeks to enter into spiritual and mystical fellowship, and in loving Whom, one finds the liberation of individuality.

These three ideas have acted and reacted, the one

upon the other, in many ways in the course of history. They seem one to us now, but they were originally distinct. Our problem is: How did this union of them happen? What value has it? Can we justify their convergence; is it illusory or is it legitimate?

2: AGNOSTICISM.

There is a point of view which refuses to touch the idea of God, unless it is first clearly defined, and then logically demonstrated. This is the view of agnosticism, and it has at least two weaknesses:

First. In so doing, the agnostic fictitiously places himself outside human life. This is really impossible, because everyone is forced to act, and that action already constitutes a judgment, and an election of one's party. It is absolutely chimerical for a man to pretend to place himself outside of humanity.

Again, it is a flagrant error to see in God, only a pure idea, hatched of abstract speculation. The idea of God is a result of moral experience.

Of course, moral experience is sometimes accused of a lack of objectivity. Its objectivity, however, consists in a number having the experience, and seeing the same results, provided they wish to. The pretension to suspend judgment in this case is really a decision to suspend re-

search into the problem of God.

Our problem is to examine closely the discussion of the divine reality, and to establish a more precise idea of God. In examining this triple idea of God we shall follow especially the method of investigating the moral experience.

3: REALITY.

Before going further, it is necessary to examine the notion of reality. In human thinking, we find two different notions of the real. Both of them are legitimate enough in their place, but it does lead to grave mistakes to confound them.

1: One calls that real which can be preceived by the sanses. This is the empirical notion of reality. In common judgment it is their precision of incorporation into sensation that gives reality to the thoughts of the savant. However it is to be noted that there are divers kinds of perception, and that sense perception is only the initial perception. There are microscopic objects and astronomical objects, and, for the scientist, the immediate sensation is never the criterion of reality. It is always necessary to interpret these appearances, to discover an intelligible significance in order to decide whether a perception is authentic or illusory, true or false.

2: Reality, to the scientist and philosopher, is not a matter of sense experience, pure and simple. It is a matter of significance. The last point of view of the savant in the judgment of reality differs then very profoundly from the point of view of the primitive community. For him there are three characteristics of the real:

A: The force of insertion of the idea or object into the knowledge and the fecundity of this insertion.

B: Its invariability despite the substitition of various point of view and various methods.

C: Its independence of relationship from the hypothesis used.

These two notions of the real can also enter into conflict but in such cases it is always the second, the rational one, which prevails. Reality in the end, is truth. In general, it is larger than mere sense. The real signifies the affirmable.

Now there are two sources of affirmation.

1: Sensation.

2: Reason.

The empirical and the necessary, but the sensible is ultimately subordinated to the rational. The Cogito is the basis of all rational thought.

Basically a fact does not take true consistency, and

then plain reality, except by the judgment of reason, which is constituted by authentic judgments of value.

4: THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE MORAL EXIGENCE.

It is in this perspective, which alone is valuable without limit and reserve, that we search for God. Our infinite aspirations are deeper than all empirical desires, and nothing of this world can ever satisfy them. However, to solve them is for us imperious and necessary. We are driven by the unrest caused by the deepest volition. We need faith in the idea of God. To live is to believe in God. Progress, as shown by success in life, verifies our affirmation.

We have seen the primacy of the Moral exigence in our life. This raises the question of whether it is universal. Does the moral exigence belong to existence in general? Are we singular exceptions from the general rule of nature, or is the most intimate depth of us the key to the order of all nature? Do we refind ourselves in nature as a whole?

5: IDEALISM.

Idealism is the doctrinal tendency to make all existence dependent upon, or even reducible to thought. It is in reality a double tendency.

1: To bring back all being to thought.

2: To subordinate all being to that which governs thought, to the idealistic exigence. At basis this is nothing but the moral exigence already seen. There is a hierarchy of functions to thought itself, and this latter type of realism is one in which the governing stress is upon the ideal rather than the idea; that is, it is a larger conception of idealism than mere logical thought. It is based upon thought itself with a larger meaning; a meaning in which thought is the whole spirit. Thought is all spiritual activity turned toward knowing. It includes all we are; images, feelings, ideas, desires, volitions; it is like a sort of universal container, or rather like a sea in which our estates and acts are the waves. That is, thought is almost equivalent to consciousness, and we could say consciousness, rather than thought. It is the primitive given par excellence. It is both absolute and immediate.

The very apparent immensity of the idealistic thesis has been the paradox of classical idealism. Here we may remark two things:

1: This new idealism is much larger and more human than the old which had too limited a base, that of logical thought.

2: It is an error to give idealism an individual interpretation. To suspend all existence upon an individual's

thought is absurd. It is My thought, but it is also The Thought. I am interior to The Thought. The relation of my thought to The Thought is the same as that of my empirical volitions to the Deepest Volition.

In partial support of this type of idealism, we may mention three simple, but very important points.

1: To know anything outside of or beyond thought is a thing absolutely unthinkable, under whatever form, and to whatever degree. Thought, in the large sense, is coextensive with the affirmable. There are no things in themselves.

2: Thought is essentially uncreatable. It, itself, constitutes a necessary instrument for all intelligible generation. The genesis of thought is unthinkable. You can never truly conceive of the abolition of all consciousness; one cannot suppose all thought abolished. It is a flagrant contradiction to pretend to think of the origin of thought. I can think of the genesis of my thought or of some part of thought but not of the origin of thought itself.

Thought is then irreducible and inconstructable, because all attempts at its deduction or of its construction suppose it as already present and acting. All theories of Materialism contain a fundamental vicious circle. Materialism is by nature incapable of comprehending itself; in-

capable of reconciling the phenomena of its proper formation with the thesis that it affirms.

3: The analysis if the notion of reality has already placed us in a perspective of idealism.

Thought is not a thing or a nature; it is an activity or rather an action. There are two main ways of conceiving the thought in connection with man:

1: As a system, or

2: As a history.

True Idealism admits only the second interpretation, and this is why it represents the true Realism, that of spirit, not of things, moral not physical. From the first point of view, knowledge comes by contemplation. From the second, knowledge is movement, and results in action.

Is it necessary to prove that the second alternative is the only acceptable one, that we must have an idealism with moral character, that is militant and not triumphant? The idealistic affirmation marks for us the right, not the fact; it expresses the direction of our thought rather than the state. There is an idealistic exigence.

6: THE BEYOND - GOD.

But this idealism does not exclude a Beyond. On the contrary it makes implicit its affirmation. We cannot

affirm at the centre of universal being a necessary principle. The whole world agrees that the only real problem is to recognize the nature of this principle not to establish its absolute existence.

Now this necessary principle must necessarily belong to the realm of thought. Reflection has put behind us in clear light the radical impossibility of pure materiality sufficing.

Again the same reflection has uncovered for us the essential uncreatedness of thought. Thought returns to itself as its own origin. This necessity we have called the idealistic exigence. Thought is also all being, the principle of all position, the stuff of all reality. It cannot be treated as an accidental supplement. Thought or consciousness appears inevitable, irreducible, primary. All existence derives from thought. It is a given creator of perpetual initiative.

This Exigence, on which depends all spirit, and by it all being, has the same characteristics, allows of the same formulas, is bound to the same analysis as is the Moral exigence. Therefore it is necessary to identify this new exigence with the Moral exigence. We have found God as the principle of all existence. God is the source of value,

of thought, of action. He ought to be conceived not as a thing, nor as a law, but as the Beyond of all existence, and of all intelligibility.

7: THE CLASSIC PROOFS.

In dealing with the traditional classic proofs, there are certain reservations of use, and certain legitimate uses to which they can be put. In our discussion here, we have established the large lines of the perspective in which these arguments take meaning and become valuable, the atmosphere of fundamental thought which they suppose, and which makes them alive. The proofs confirm and make precise our views. Each one of them in effect proves in its own manner the idealistic exigence.

All true philosophies have always been affirming God, sometimes however without giving Him his real name. God is independent of the world, and he is infinitely more than the world can manifest.

8: PROGRESS IN OUR IDEA OF GOD.

Finally in closing this discussion of the problem of God, we have seen that in a sense, the problem is resolved in advance. In another sense, it remains always for us to solve, for the idea of God works without ceasing in us.

At each epoch, a work must be accomplished, which remains essentially the same, and this work constitutes for each epoch the true demonstration of God.

We must:

1: Vanquish by a progressive evolution of knowledge the accumulated criticisms against the notion of God just then in service.

2: We must make stand out in its full light, the persistent fecundity and the inexhaustible vitality of the idea.

VIII. THE IDEA OF GOD.

1: PROBLEM OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

In our discussion so far we have left to the idea of God an extreme largeness. This has been necessary, because the idea is not the result of theoretical speculations, but emanates from a concrete experience. However the problem is not so much to solve a problem of this kind, as to present in correct terms the problem to be decided. What is it that we affirm, when we affirm that God exists?

The idea of God has had a long history, and is very complex. Many elements in it which were at one time essential are but survivals today. We must consider what experiences of life and of what synthesis of thought both in the past and now, the idea of God comes from, and what is its exact meaning for us.

We have already spoken of the three fold source of the idea of God, which sources have a common basis and an identity of function. These are:

1: The God of the primitive imagination, practical and social.

2: The Supreme Principle of the philosopher.

3: The interior God of Moral experience. How are these combined?

2: DISTINCTION - SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE VS. IMAGERY.

Touching the idea of God, it is firstly necessary to distinguish between

1: The Deep Spiritual Significance of the idea, and

2: the imagery in which it is expressed, and which has been used to discover Him. This latter is always defective.

The grandest ideas often have the most humble origins. In the past polytheism has existed more in the intelligence of the worshipper than in his religion. It has been said: All men,- they are Man: All the gods,- they are God.

3: ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

We know that historically one of these gods, the tribal god of Israel has for us become God. God for us is the moral exigence, but in history the original idea of God was the social or tribal one,which later became identified with the rational God, and the mystical God.

Practically, for primitive man, the universe was limited to the clan. Now the social god represented the clan. He expresses the intelligible unity, and thus one discerns in him the germ of what became the metaphysical God

Again the philosophers must admit that the rational God is the true God, the God of religion, only if he has

the possibility of a personal relation with man, if he has a moral character, and by consequence a social one, if he is in some manner the God of that larger clan that one calls humanity.

The clan is the highest spiritual reality that primitive men see or experience. Under a very imperfect quality, it is already a supra-sensitive and mystical moral reality. It is in and by an experience of life that the social God is known and thought.

Inversely the God of the mystic is also a social God, since on the one hand, he is for spirits, the center of fellowship, and since for another thing, as Le Roy goes on to assert, he only reveals himself in the bosom of a church in which the collective and traditional faith informs and judges the experience of individuals.

4: THE MORAL EXIGENCE.

The affirmation of God is essentially that of the primacy of the Moral exigence. This exigence can be seen from several points of view. The philosopher insists upon the function of principle which pertains to this existence. The mystic insists upon its moral character. The religious affirmation is a synthesis of these several points of view. There are then not so much three heterogenuous sources of

the idea of God as three states or moments in the progress of analysis which discerns him. Briefly we can already see how the idea of God rests upon several apparent origins, discovered in the passage of thought. We also see the justification for retaining the traditional name.

The moral Exigence shows itself in us in an impulsion toward spiritual ascension. It is the source of all realized spirituality, and we find it again under the same traits in the principle of all existence. Throughout and always it reveals itself by its realizing function, as active generating reality. It is the universal and supreme principle of realization. That is the point which it is most important to make precise; for upon it rests properly the question of the divine existence.

5: THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

To affirm the existence of God is, in a sense, to affirm that the universe is not inert, blind, and without a soul; that the consciousness of man with his exigence of spiritual life is not without an echo of something more real and truer then itself, that it is not without foundation and guarantee; that in the origin and basis of all existence, one finds the same principle again, and that this principle is one Volition of infinite good.

The being, that we properly are, and universal being, both find themselves henceforth dependent on the Moral exigence as their first principle. We cannot reduce this principle without contradiction and the vicious circle. All is derived from it. The Moral exigence subsists in itself and by itself. This leads to two conclusions, which are, however, really negative conclusions.

1: God must not be thought of by us under any form inferior to that which we call real existence, such as, being a simple idea, a logical category, or an abstract principle.

2: God cannot be thought of as leaning upon anything but himself.

The existence of God, however, does not resemble any of those that experience presents to us. God cannot be conceived under any of the modes of existence positively and directly known by us; God is not a particular being among other beings; He is the principle of being, he is above all forms of real existence conceivable or observable by us. We might say that he is "Hyper-existent," but it is to be noted that this barbarous word does not designate a definite concept, but rather an attitude, a direction of our thought, a sense of movement by which our thought goes to God. God is then the supreme source

of universal existence; he is not being, but the ineffable principle of being.

In summation, the affirmation that "God exists" affirms three things:

1: Negatively that God is not below real existence, that he does not exist only in the manner of an abstraction or of an ideal.

2: In a direct sense, God is above all real existence, that is that he must be thought in the direction that marks the positive concept of existence, but as an infinite beyond.

3: In a pragmatic sense, that God is the universal and first principle of existence.

This formula satisfies the several needs of our spirit, both critical and religious. It conserves the traditional meaning also. It respects both the mystery of God in itself and the mystery of God in the soul.

6: THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

Here we meet a new problem, that of how to conceive the existence and primacy of the divine reality, having affirmed it. This is, basically, the only decisive problem, the problem of the personality rather than of the existence of God. The existence of God in a certain sense is

never denied. Basically it never can be denied. Personality is the difficulty. What is wanted is a living God, with whom it is possible to have personal relations in a fellowship of life. Furthermore it is a problem of the moral order; it is much more than a problem bearing upon the principle of thought or of existence. We must solve this problem on the basis of our deeper spiritual life.

Now consider the interior action of God in us. We meet him as a Moral Exigence, as the inspirer of our first Volition. He is the immanent principle of our life; he creates and orients us. We have already seen that all attempts at reduction lead only to a vicious circle.

In brief, God acts in us, and upon us in the mode of a person, of goodness, and of love.

Another thing is that obedience to the interior solicitation of God, the giving of ourselves to Him, is the condition of our proper birth and progress into personality. God makes us into more and more of persons. God, in a word, manifests himself by his personalizing function, as a personalizing action. How can we not declare him personal? God is the principle of personalization.

7: THE SUPER - PERSONALITY OF GOD.

However it is clear that God cannot be conceived by

us under a form of personality like what we observe in ourselves. Such anthropomorphism would be to affirm an individualization which one does not find in God. To affirm the divine existence as an individual and separate existence, which juxtaposes itself to other existences, more or less analogical, is truly an atheistic conception, the making of God into an idol.

But on the other hand, God cannot be thought of under any form, which is inferior to personality, such as, as an abstract principle, a formal category, an inert substance, a simple ideal aspect of cosmic flux, or as unconscious and blind force. The God who acts in us, acts in us in the fashion of love, and it is by Him that we become persons. It is fundamentally impossible to find in him the foundation of our personal existence, if we think of Him under a form inferior or strange to personality. God is not impersonal. And that is not all; God is the source of human personality.

Therefore, we must affirm that in a sense God is "Super-personal." However it is to be noted well that the word "Super-personal" does not designate a definite concept. It, also, signifies an attitude, and a direction of our thought, the sense of movement by which our thought moves toward God. This statement "God is Super-Personal"

says that in conceiving God we must go to the infinite limits of our highest positive concept, that of personality, and even go beyond.

"God is a person" has for us a pragmatically positive sense. It means that for us God is the infinite source of personality, a source wherefrom we can augment without limit our own proper belief in personality. He is a personalizing inspiration in us. He is a love which surrounds us and to Whom we can only respond in reciprocal love. We come to give to our relations with him the personal form. The image of a human personality is here infinitely deficient. At best, it is a mere symbol.

To affirm that God is personal has then a positive sense, that in Him, we seek our personality, and the Reality of Personality.

This solution leaves the mystery of God intact in Him. It respects all analogous symbols. It does not abandon us in a vague indetermination, for we have still the metaphors and positive realities. The image of human personality is the highest and most perfect symbol of God, and there is really no danger of anthropomorphism.

It does not do to have the chimerical ambition to avoid the whole image; that is not human.

There is also a triple signification, negative, direct, and pragmatic in the affirmation "God is a person," parallel to those a propos to his existence. This significance in its triple aspect responds to our different needs.

If it is objected that there is not sufficient precision to the idea of God here presented, we can only point out that we are not attempting a complete theology.

8: IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE.

The first question of one wishing a completer outline of the idea of God might be: Is God immanent or transcendent? This is a badly put question, for it makes an antinomy, and renders it insoluble.

An absolutely transcendent type of theism is in the eyes of the philosopher an atheistic conception, for it puts God, as a kind of great individual, by the side of, or above other individuals radically distinct in juxtaposition.

On the other hand absolute immanence as in classical pantheism makes God a vague universal substance. However it is an error to think of God as on the same plan as the world.

God is to us more interior than even ourselves, be-

cause he is the inspiration in us that makes us live, but also, because he is the inspiration that solicits us, he is infinitely transcendent to us.

The two conceptions opposed, that of God immanent and that of God transcendent are both equally false, or dependent upon the angle from which one views them, equally true, the first from the static point of view, the other from the dynamic. From a dynamic point of view, a reconciliation becomes possible, and in verity, God is at the same time immanent and transcendent.

We are not by nature achieved and closed. On the contrary, our life is an incessant creation, and it is the same with the world, if one considers it in itstotality. It is by God's immanence in us, that we attain God as our interior source, deeper in us than all our states, acts, thoughts, than even our heart and will, in a word than our person itself. Also His transcendence in us is the impulsion which carries us beyond ourselves. He is both immanent and transcendent. Immanent in his presence as inspiring action. Transcendent in his infinity of creation and of reality always higher, towards which he attracts us without limit, and raises us; transcendent in his character of inexhaustible principle.

However it is rather we, who are immanent in God, for we cannot escape Him nor come out of His presence. He is, in all orders of being, the atmosphere of power to realize, by which we ourselves realize ourselves bit by bit. He is our Deepest Volition.

9: GOD AS CREATOR.

The creatorship of God is contemporaneous. To say that God is creator is to affirm that the whole world is in a relation of total dependence upon him, which fact we have already affirmed in that of the primacy of the Moral Exigence. God is providence, and supreme end. These are nothing, in principle, but various ways of enunciating the primacy of the Moral exigence.

10: THE USE OF THE WORD "GOD."

However it might be objected that we have used the word "God" in a wrong sense, that we have merely solved a word. We must consider whether it is illicit to use the word "God" in a sense not exactly coinciding with the older meanings. Now it must be noted that a word does not stand for a dead idea, or a concept closed and fixed, but for a movement of thought. The unique obligation in using a word is to respect a certain continuity of transition, and a certain permanency of direction. If the matter is considered in this way, it will be seen that we have not left the traditional use of the word "God".

11: THE SUPER - EXISTENCE OF GOD AS ORTHODOX.

The mystics have not hesitated to say that in the manner in which one attributes existence to things of this world, it is necessary to affirm that God does not exist: Not because He is less than these things, but on the contrary, because he is incomparably more; and with this position Thomas Aquinas, Saint Thomas, the ancient authoritative theologian of the Roman Church agrees. God is infinitely above all existence. He is not being, but the ineffable principle of being.

We may sum up this position as follows:

1: We cannot conceive the existence of God under any of the forms positively known by us.

2: This existence is not below, but above;not behind, but beyond, and is infinitely above and beyond all forms of real existence observable or conceivable by us.

3: God is the universal and supreme source of realization, and the sovereign principle of exigence.

4: We must conduct ourselves in relations to Him, as in a relation to the principle and source from which we draw our own proper existence and our own proper reality.

12: THE MANNER OF KNOWING GOD.

We must pass now to the manner of knowing God. We

know Him in our own inner life, as exigence and inspiration. We find Him in Nature as the principle of a spiritual community. The progress toward personality brings us closer the one to the other, and we discover that the indiviaual separations are only matters of transition, and of the surface of life. St.Paul says that God is not far from each of us, for in Him, we live, and move, and have our being. It is a flagrant anthropomorphism to give God a human personality. God is everywhere, or rather God is the Everywhere.

Le Roy spends some time at this juncture in insisting that his views are rigorously orthodox even from the point of view of his own Roman Catholic church, and this interest in not breaking with any of the historic teachings of his own church is interwoven throughout his last two chapters, in which he "mops up", to use the military phrase, after having presented his thesis.

IX. THE CONDITIONS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE.

1: SUMMARY.

In our discussion we began with the fact of human unrest, and from that discovered the primacy of Moral exigence. We found that the affirmation of God is implicit for us even in the act of living, and above all in the act of seeking and of willing. Our method was that of the examination of consciousness, and then with the use of pure reason, we found that the external world plays a complementary and confirmative role in the establishing of our thesis.

The faith that incites in us the moral exigence is inherent to even the act of living, and therefore cannot be judged to be radically illusory, for this would be to conclude that fundamentally life is incoherent. Pascal said: "Console yourself, you could not seek me, if you had not already found me." Faith in God is the respiration of the spirit; it dwells indissoluble mixed in all effort. It is an inevitable affirmation, if we are to escape the vicious circle of materialism.

2: THE ROAD TO FAITH.

What is then the road to faith? Returning to our

distinction between

1: The social God.

2: The metaphysical God.

3: The God of the inner life, we must note,that the metaphysician has only speculated on God because faith in Him was already present. We must rest then on the other two sources of faith in God. It is an interior unrest that inserts us into the universal hyman unrest, and therefore, the inner life is the natural center of the research. We believe because we have been taught to believe, and this teaching was received from society, and from human tradition, but this tradition itself is in the wake of human consciousness.

We must conceive of this inner life as a life of thought in the largest sense of the term, and not as a life of pure feeling. We find God within, especially in moral experience. We ask ourselves, if the inner God is also the God of reason and of the universe, and we find complementary considerations, not strong enough to fix the right kind of a God, but strong enough to show that the inner God already discovered is also the God of the external work.

Whenever one affirms Reason, Truth, or Justice as the sovereign realities, worthy of all sacrifice, and morally

exigent in us, one believes in God, whether one designates Him by that name or not. The possible objections are only two:

1: The objection: "I did not know that this is God," and

2: The problem of personality.

Two principle poles can be seen, detached in the bosom of the continutiy of the God conception:

1: The Metaphysical - in which God is thought of as supreme principle for the explanation of existence, and

2: The religious, in which God is thought of as an act i ve being, with Whom one can enter into personal relations. The problem is to synthesize these two typically opposite points of view. Historically the same problem was presented in the synthesis of the God-conception of Hellenism with that of Judaism.

However, it must be recognized that the latter, the Jewish or religious point of view is first. The religious life is essentially relation with God, movement toward God, union with God, and even participation in the life of God. Religion is participation in spiritual realities, rather than simple speculative adhesion to the pure ideas, which theoretically represent these realities.

3: MORALITY AND RELIGION -.

There is a deep difference which distinguishes moral-

ity from religion.

Morality is a result of the facts of Obligation and of liberty. The moral affirmation is properly preparatory to the truly religious affirmation. It is a duty for man to realize himself as a spirit. Simple morality affirms this, but it leaves us with only our own power. It has no prophetic promise to console us; it does not tell us that our ideal has a sufficient guarantee in the bosom of nature; it does not assure life of triumph by revealing the secrets of the center.

Religion, on the contrary, preoccupies itself with that which happens. It claims to deliver from evil; to open the sources of love, and to define the relationship of values.

The religious life affirms first of all that the world of sensible experience is not the whole of reality. It affirms another order of reality, the beyond, the supernatural, and another perspective on life, the eternal. The religious soul affirms that in this world and this life, man is engaged in relationships which do not terminate in this world nor in this life.

Morality has finished its work, when it has established a theory of the practical. Religion is the searching out of means which shall require a practical issue of the theory.

Morality is not a source of support, this source, religion alone gives to us.

It is noticeable how the profession of certain doctrines has been insisted upon, because it fortifies the will, but we are dealing with more here than just doctrine; we are dealing with a relation with the Realities.

4: FAITH, IN WHAT?

The religious soul does not solely affirm the pure and simple existence of the Beyond. It affirms wisdom, justice, goodness. The more deeply it is religious, the more decidedly it avows the inexpressible mystery of its object. It has no better terms at hand, and yet there is always an invincible exigence which presses it to define the undefinable, under penalty of seeing the whole efficacy of the idea evaporate. The religious life affirms that all is dependent upon the Beyond, and is in movement toward Him; that He is the supreme guarantee of our values and that in Him alone lies our destiny. We find a necessity for a revelation, and for an act of redemption.

God is the proper name, which the religious soul gives to the Beyond, and acceptance of this name with what it involves is accepting the religious thesis. That is why we begin with the problem of God.

The religious soul has little relationship with the classic proofs of God. Sometimes they cause some strange illusions as to the real motives of his faith, but that is about all.

Faith in God is not something finished and complete, but a germinal point of departure from which to learn more of God. It can be generated by a contemplation of our inner life by meditation, and by asceticism. This last may seem strange, but Le Roy says that asceticism is merely the resolution taken in advance, not in words only, but in reality, to say yes to the illumination. It is thus merely sincerity with oneself.

5: CONDITIONS OF THE MORAL EXPERIENCE.

It is necessary for the coming into an effective experience, that the method should be practical, and not speculative. The work of verification also has a moral side. Those who make an enquiry purely critical, intellectual, and rational, really refuse experience. The truly sincere seeker goes beyond this in generous struggle, humble and willing to render himself capable of seeing. It is a reality of such a nature, that in order to acquire the sense of it, it is necessary, provided it becomes perceptible, to conform to its requirements. However it should be noted that here we are exposed to an evident peril of auto-suggestion, and this is

a manner of hypocrisy.

6: PRAYER.

We are not masters, free to present the problem of God as an object of speculative curiosity, or otherwise. It is presented in advance, even by the fact of our insertion into life, and living, whether we wish it to be or not, is always its solving.

When one has recognized the duty to conduct oneself with regard to God as with regard to a person, this attitude is called prayer. There is no true seeking of God, except by prayer. All other methods are atheistic in their principle, for they make of God an inert thing of matter or of abstraction. M. Blondel says that one truly treats God as an idol if one endeavors to make of him solely an object of knowledge, and if one does not reverse such an original action in the reciprocity of fellowship which unites one to him.

We are not here occupied with prayer that attempts to interfere in the material world, but with inner prayer, the prayer that aspires to religious progress. It has nothing to do with prayer that demands an effect in the external order.

Furthermore, prayer is not a matter of ritual formulas, nor of many words. It is an inner turning toward an ideal

of ever higher and purer spirituality.

Some have a repugnance to prayer, and this very repugnance is a sign that prayer is something more than simple reflection. This repugnance is the sign of an occult refusal of the moral exigence.

Prayer is not only emotion and thought; it is also veritable action and conduct. It is the orientation of oneself on the whole toward the greater, a struggle to establish in oneself the primacy of the moral, that is to say, to establish in oneself the reign of God.

Prayer is a search, and it is a fact of experience that prayer ceases to be a simple monologue; that it receives a response, for Truth searches for us more than we search for it.

7: THE SOCIAL NATURE OF RELIGION AND THE CHURCH.

Religion is first of all an inner fact, an inner attitude. However it externalizes itself in all the life of man. It externalizes itself first of all in the acts of individuals, but this is not all.

Le Roy says that the true God is the God with Whom one communicates, and not the God of isolated abstractions. He is the God of history, of the concrete spiritual life, and

not that of solitary speculation. He is the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scientists. Man never finds his good and his repose when he is alone. The church is the regular organization of the collective and durable religious life. Religion is a matter which is essentially collective and social. We have a certain solidarity, the one with the other. Religion is also social in duration; it requires tradition; it is a progressive continuity.

Le Roy holds that history shows that religion has always taken spontaneously a social and traditional form. Primitive religions, he says, are always those of the family, the clan, the city, and the nation. In a word, the religious life in all its manifestations, appears to the historian as the work of the durable community. Thus Christianity and Judaism are to us the legacies of ancient Israel, and the latter has formed a spiritually antonomous society, the Church. The group (with its greater duration) is the necessary organ of the religious life. Le Roy says that all attempts at individual religion tend toward the complete cessation of the effective religious life, for religious life always needs a social form. Individual religion is a contradiction in terms. The purpose of religion is progressive fellowship with God, and the same inner God is in fellowship with all the men in the world. The initial impulsion of the religious life gives us a certain solidarity, the one with the other.

Le Roy states that individuality, properly speaking, is that which separates and opposes us one to the other, and that this type of individuality is in us a limitation of spirit. Our essential problem is to pass from egoistic individuality to true personality. The formula of true personality is, "All in one, and one in all ". God is the center and principle of our latent unity. Religion is essentially social. If our destiny is realization of spirit, the end is universal communion in God. The means for the attaining of this end is the church.

This is not all: the struggle for spiritual realization is a work that is trans-historic, and in which, we have a solidarity in life and in death. The spiritual life then requires a society which extends itself both in duration and in space. This need is met by the church.

8: LIVING TRADITION.

Tradition has commonly been thought of as the contrary of spiritual progress, but this is a mistake. Tradition must not be simple repetition or a literal servile, and mechanical transmission of the concepts of the past. In reality, tradition is life and progress, a movement of perpetual reinterpretation, much more than immobility. It is dynamic; in a word it is experience, the memory of humanity.

X. THE LAST OBSTACLES -.

1: THE MYSTERY OF GOD.

Our solution of this problem leaves a number of difficulties, of which the first and most immediately apparent bears upon the knowledge which one can have of God. God is incomprehensible, and a great mystery.

However a certain knowledge of God is possible. We may know him by way of negation,-what he is not. We can know many of his attributes. The multiplicity of these attributes forces us to evoke the image of a unique center, but this center tells us of the diversity of our attitudes rather than the true nature of God.

2: THE NECESSITY FOR ANTHROPOMORPHISM.

All effective religious life has always been an attempt to participate in the very life of God, and to enter into fellowship with Him. We have a profound need for an accessible God, who is near us and with us. The primitive idol responded to this deep need. The idol was an error metaphysically, but is is at the same time a psychological verity. The highest thought that man can have of God is likewise an idol in the first sense of the word for it is an attempt to lodge the infinite. Man is neither an angel nor a beast; therefore the

anthropomorphic symbols are practically necessary for him.

Consider prayer: it is impossible or at least very difficult to pray to the philosophic God. True prayer is collogical, familiar, heart to heart. An anthropomorphic concept of God is for us a faith that philosophy forbids, but religiously it is necessary.

3: THE CHURCH.

Man conceives with difficulty. He realizes the direct relationship of the individual soul to God only by fugitive and rare insights. This is the profound reason for the spontaneous tendency to socialize religion. The religious society appears to him as already the commencement of the divine incarnation.

In fact, our analysis of the religious life has already led us to recognize its essentially collective and transhistoric nature; that it is essentially social and traditional. There is more than this however. The end of religion is universal communion with God. But the means which prepare a man must be homogeneous, and this is why the religious life is essentially a work of spiritual cooperation.

Religious feeling is both intimate and profound, but however intimate and profound, it is the opposite of the

individual. Individuality merely represents the surface of ourselves. Our individuality is the body; it is matter, it is our limit as spirits. At the deepest and innermost depths of ourselves, we find a germ of spiritual community. The religious life is essentially social both in co-existence, and in duration.

The Church is furthermore more or less of a human mediator between God and man. As a mediator, it is nothing but an approximation, but an essential one.

Now the question arises, is there necessarily a church more particular than humanity itself taken in its entirety. It is true that, in a sense, humanity is already the church that we seek. The function of religion is to make us spirits, and the activities of humanity help in so far as they are religious, but they do not suffice. There is needed, humanity organized for the religious life. We cannot say yet that humanity organized for religion is an institution properly speaking, a particular society in the bosom of human society in general. However Le Roy does say that we can know that the institution, the Church, is a part of such a special organization of mankind for religion.

4: EVIL.

We are now apart from human unrest, and from the pro-

blem which it presents, since we have found God as response. God Himself is liberty, and He gives Himself to us as the principle of value.

However, we are still confronted by the problem of evil. It is the inspirer of negation and of revolt; it is inherent even in human unrest, and its problem has not been solved by the philosophers. It is ignorance, error, the attraction of base pleasures, egoism, and more. How can God stand such a world? How was He able to make it, or even permit it? The only answer is the eternal silence of Divinity. Why, if I am the son of God, is evil in me? Some have imagined that evil is nothing, but a transitory imperfection inherent in the condition of being creatures. This is an insufficient idea, for evil shows itself as an active and positive reality. It is effort contrary to the Deepest Volition. It is a revolt against human solidarity, against the moral order wanted by God.

However philosophy has never solved this problem, and we may note that all solutions that arrest themselves with the human and limit themselves to the present are manifestly insufficient. The problem of evil is a cosmic problem, and one lying indissolubly in the entire history of thought.

In the face of this reality of evil only one solution of the problem is truly effective and complete.

5: REDEMPTION.

An individual is lacking in power; individualism is a flagrant error. One only can have true redemptive efficacy. True redemption cannot lie in anything, but in the work of God, and that of man founded upon Him. Here we have the idea of divine incarnation. No objection for evil subsists against God. On the contrary he alone can aid us always to resolve the problem. It is His love that searches for us; to us it is only necessary to respond. And Le Roy holds that for that, a way is open, the way of historic religion.

Le Roy now closes with a reference to the man of sorrows, dying on Calvary for the sins of the world.

XI. EVALUATION AND CRITICISM OF LE ROY'S POINT OF VIEW.

Having now finished presenting the point of view of Edouard Le Roy's "Le Probleme de Dieu" we may consider it from the critical point of view in order to decide which parts of his thesis are valid additions to our thought, and which are merely relics, or false experiments. We shall begin by criticizing his more fundamental concepts.

1: FUNDAMENTAL POINTS OF VIEW.

A.ABSOLUTE UNITY OF LIFE.

Underlying Le Roy's whole approach to the problem of God, is a feeling that the universe is absolutely one stream of consciousness, or one first intuition, and a distrust of any type of analysis, or of dealing with particular points. He dismisses the classic proofs of God, for such proof must be a matter of the whole life, not of the particular details that these proofs fix upon. He is somewhat distrustful of pure knowledge for by its nature, it must fasten upon details, and work by analysis. For instance, pure knowledge can never solve the problem of human life, because it can know only a part of the whole, what man now is; it can never know what man ought and wants to be, nor can it know the future.

Le Roy insists that the various threads which he is able to draw out from the whole of the universe are not truly separate, but really one; thus his three concepts of God turn out to be but aspects, the one of the other; and he affirms that with God and the Moral exigence, it is not a matter of the affirmation of God being a necessary consequence of that of the Moral Exigence, but that the two affirmations are essentially one.

He is basically right in this desire for the recognition of universal unity, but he carries it to too great an extreme in his distrust of analysis. The human mind is not fitted for the full grasping of universal intuitions, nor does it fall into really grave errors by analysis. At least, however great such errors from division and analysis may be, they are not equal to those which would result from an attempt to think in intuitions alone, for that would be, to leave every human prejudice free to affirm itself as an intuition, and therefore not to be tested by the merely inferior findings of analytical thought. In his discussion of philosophy, Le Roy states that every honest mind perceives such philosophic fundamentals as the reality of the spiritual life, and the fact of freedom, but in actuality there is very little to indicate that anything of the sort is true.

B: HIERARCHIES OF THOUGHT.

A peculiarity of Le Roy's thought is the arrangement of many instruments of thought into hierarchies. Examples of this are:

1: IN the realm of Will, there is one deepest and most profound volition. Other particular volitions come from it, but they are not equal; on the contrary they are of many different degrees of profundity.

2: In thought or consciousness, there is likewise one total intuition, and other lesser intuitions, which are of various degrees.

3: Ends also range themselves in such a hierarchy.

4: Existence is of various degrees: God is truly hyperexistent, the principle of existence. On the other hand, abstract categories are less truly existent than certain other objects. It is in a hierarchy of reality that God stands at the highest.

5: Again he seems to have some such conception of the nature of the universe, when he speaks of God as being in reality "super-personal."

6: Probably, Le Roy's certainty that the deepest Me is not many, but is one, is heightened by this peculiarity of his thought.

This way of thinking is somewhat connected with his

insistence upon unity. It is very definitely opposed to any type of pluralism. If it applies to beings, it would be the opposite of democratic.

C: MAN AS THE KEY TO THE UNIVERSE.

Much more important and valuable is the idea that man is an abridgment of the universe. Le Roy thinks of nature as a whole as having the same character as has man. Thus man is more than a mere convergence of forces in a mechanistic world, but has freedom. Therefore there must be freedom in the inner nature of the universe. Perhaps, this particular point of view is most basic in Le Roy's method. His insistence upon the absolute unity of life probably grows out of the fact that man's consciousness is a unit. Consciousness is never still, but is always in motion. Therefore Le Roy insists that the universe is never static, but is always a movement. This idea of man as the key to the nature of the universe goes back to Bergson, and from him back to Schopenhauer (according to Dodson). But Schopenhauer, because of his own misfortunes of disposition, was not able to use it to the best advantage. It consists in thinking of the universe as having an exterior aspect, which we see and measure, and study in science, and an inner reality, whose phenomena, our poor minds are not able to fathom. The only place that we can really get hold of the inner reality of the universe is in our own

consciousness.

This is the reason for Le Roy's approach to God by the analysis of consciousness; and we must admit that it is a method of approach which cannot but be very valuable.

However, it must be recognized, that the subjective method of self-analysis has its limitations. We sometimes make errors in our own self-analysis. Some consciousness (as was probably Schopenhauer's) are somewhat pathological. The results from this method must be compared with those from other methods, and for this necessary criticism, Le Roy's distrust of the analytical method is not wholesome.

We should gain knowledge from all possible sources, and our trust in one source should not be so great, that another method is left out of account. No method should be allowed to fall into its own peculiar errors. In the general thought of today, however, that which Le Roy most insists upon, is undoubtedly too generally neglected.

D: MOVEMENT.

Now when we look within, in order to see the inner nature of reality, we do not find anything static, but on the contrary, a ceaseless stream of consciousness, an unceasing willing, and human unrest. Therefore Movement, and ceaseless dynamic activity are essential to Le Roy's

whole point of view. Our thought is a movement. Thought as a whole is not a system, but a history. At the roots of universal existence we find a vital impulse, not a static order of the universe. Within ourselves we find a Moral impulsion, not a mere static moral order. When we see them in a dynamic perspective, the seeming opposition between immanence and transcendence in God disappears, as do many of the speculative difficulties with regard to human freedom. Movement took place by means of instinctive spontaneity, until man arose with his clearer consciousness. Even tradition, in Le Roy's hands must become a dynamic thing, a constantly growing memory of the race, not the lifeless clutch of a dead past.

It seems to me that this insistence upon the fact of movement is entirely right. It is only because of the limitations of our minds that we usually think in static terms. To use a test, which Le Roy himself might not quite approve, this dynamic view of the universe fits much better with the facts that we know than does any static view.

E: CONFLICT AND CONTRADICTION.

Le Roy makes a sharp distinction between the Deepest Volition on the one hand, and particular volitions on the other, and similarly between Intuition on the one hand, and particular intuitions and analyses upon the other. He goes

on to show that the particular volitions and particular intuitions and analyses, may come into a state of contradiction with the First Volition, and the First Intuition - this because of error on the one hand, and of a mixture with the materiality in us on the other. This contradiction forms a part of his theory of evil. We may follow him thus far, but he goes further. He seems to hold that both the secondary volitions, and the secondary intuitions and analyses as a group can often be in violent opposition to the deeper and more real First Volition and First Intuition. Therefore our particular volitions and particular intuitions and analyses cannot be relied upon. Here is the basis for his extreme insistence upon the intuitive method, and that only.

Now here I think he is mistaken. Some of our particular volitions, and particular intuitions and analyses may get out of accord with the more fundamental ones, but in such a case we would discover this lack of concord only by reason of the conflict among the particular volitions and the particular intuitions and analyses themselves. In such a case by an analysis of the particular volitions and particular intuitions, we would find the more basic volitions and intuitions, and then check the particulars that were somewhat out of accord with their originals.

In such a case, if such could exist, in which all the particulars were as a group in opposition to the original volitions and original intuitions, it would be utterly impossible to get back to these basic volitions and basic intuitions. Furthermore, there would be nothing to bring this lack of agreement to light.

We must ever be on guard against error both in our desires and in our thinking, but Le Roy's method of going directly to basic volition and basic intuition is not the valid corrective,

1: because as a method, it would lead to a picking and choosing among the facts presented to us in consciousness and the world (something which Le Roy denies the right of science to do), and,

2: by leaving us only deep intuitions, which our minds are not able adequately to handle, it leaves us in such a mental chaos, that any prejudice or self-styled revelation may come in under the cloak of being some deep intuition, with no guard to check upon its validity.

Other aspects of this inner contradiction, counter-volition, and conflict in the universe are Le Roy's contradiction within man, his idea of morality as the adjustment of two aspects of life, his distinction between the true, and the good, his theory of the reason for some

people's repugnance to prayer, and the great facts of human unrest, and of evil.

G: PARTIAL AGNOSTICISM.

There is a certain element of partial agnosticism in Le Roy's thought. It is because our knowledge, based upon particulars, is unsafe, that he resorts to intuition. Pure knowledge can never solve the nature of man. We cannot prove God, we can only show a man that actually he believes in God. Likewise we cannot prove to a man what he ought to will, but only show him what he actually does will.

However Le Roy does not remain in the realm of pure agnosticism, for he recognizes, and reiterates that we must make decisions upon matters upon which the evidence is not conclusive. Such decisions are necessary for action.

This partial agnosticism, checked as it is, is thoroughly wholesome. By means of it we are enabled to retain positive convictions, and yet have them open for further study. We say that God is personal and existent. It is the best we can say, but God is infinitely more, he is both super-personal and hyper-existent, and we are left free to search out this more.

H: IDEALISM.

Le Roy's "idealism" is very interesting. It is quite definitely an ideal-ism, rather than an idea(l)ism. He He is too insistent upon the unity of all consciousness and upon the comparative lack of value of mere logical thought to fall into classical idealism. For him, thought is almost equivalent to consciousness, and all existence depends upon it.

His definition of reality is idealistic, and, it seems to me, is rather extreme.

An interesting idea is his conception of materiality as being merely dead thought, thought which has run down. Most of us find this conception rather hard to think.

Another interesting idea is that the body limits the spirit. He replies to an objection to Immortality that is based upon the conception of the body as a necessary instrument of precision to the spirit, The two ideas are not actually opposed; a certain limitation of the spirit would be necessary for precision and for practical action upon the near at hand.

Le Roy's idealism in general seems to be more adequate as an explanation of the universe than are the more common types of idealism, which are based upon a

narrower conception of thought. It is more human and larger. It will probably be a valuable addition to our philosophy.

2: NON - ESSENTIALS.

The systems of most pioneers contain vestigial remains from the past, and also new errors which are non-essential. We shall now deal with these elements in Le Roy's argument.

A: TRADITIONALISM.

Le Roy's environmental background may explain, at least in part, many things in his argument.

1: He is very insistent upon the absolute orthodoxy of his thesis from the Roman Catholic point of view.

2: He imagines that the mystical God can only be met in the bosom of the Church. This idea he uses to prove that the mystical God is also social.

3: His extended discussion of the social nature of religion, and of the Church are colored more or less by his churchly antecedents.

4: He retains Tradition, even while explaining its meaning away.

5: He says religion must externalize itself.

6: He insists that anthropomorphic ideas of God are necessary for the religious life.

7: He takes it very much for granted, that primitive

religion, arose in a social form. Here he agrees with the majority of French anthropologists. Durkheim, from a careful study of the primitive Australians, decided that their religion was essentially a worshipping of itself by the group.

On the other hand, the majority of American anthropologists would not agree with this. The religion of the American Indians was individualistic. The greater backwardness of the Australians in general culture may not be a proof of their being more primitive, but of their having deteriorated. The whole question is very far from settled.

These elements are in no way essential to Le Roy's major thesis.

B: NEW MEANINGS FOR OLD TERMS.

One of the elements of strength in Le Roy's work is the fact that he retains old dogmas, and concepts, but breathes into them a higher meaning. However, in some cases, he carries this process to such extremes, that the result is the retention of some old time-honored word or phrase, attached to an absolutely new or different conception.

Thus:

1: Tradition is a word that is retained. For him,

it signifies something dynamic, the whole memory of the race.

2: Asceticism is an aid to faith. But asceticism means the decision to follow the directions of the inner Moral Exigence. It is almost equivalent to the "Decision for Christ" of the Christian Endeavor Society.

3: Le Roy opposes individualism. However, the word is restricted to the merely external devisive physical factors.

In this use of individualism, the term is debased, because he has taken over an opposition something much higher.

C: ARGUMENT FROM THE NECESSITY OF THOUGHT.

In many places, Le Roy argues from the necessity of thought. Thus, the genesis of thought itself is unthinkable, therefore thought must be primary. This type of argument is one that was formerly much used, but in many spheres has now been driven back before a triumphant empiricism. Hume was inclined to limit this type of argument to the field of mathematics. Thus the axioms of geometry have represented the classic examples of things that were considered true, because anything else is unthinkable. Yet at the present time the argument from the

necessity of thought is subject to attack in their case also.

1: Certain physicists such as Einstein have cast doubt upon the absolute truth of the axioms even in our own universe.

2: Much more important in its bearing upon the argument from the necessity of thought are the phenomena of Non-Euclidian Geometry. In this, the mathematician starts with the denial of one or more of these axioms. Now we would expect that the result would be chaos. Actually, all the elements of the imaginary world without the axiom fall into a logical system, entirely thinkable.

Thus at the present time, this type of argument is subject to the severest attacks even at the point where it seemed strongest.

3: PERSONAL RELIGION.

Le Roy's ideas of personal religion are very wholesome. Religion is an experience of reality, not a mere speculative adherence to any set of beliefs. Prayer is an inner communion with, and turning of the whole man toward God. Mere words, formulas, and ritual are not sufficient. Prayer should be collogual, and in experience, it ceases to be a monologue.

His idea that repugnance to prayer is a sign of a

rebellion against the Moral Exigence is worthy of thought.

We have already spoken of certain vestigial remains such as the stress upon the need for anthropomorphism, and the peculiar idea that the mystical God must be met in the religious organization.

The generally inner experimential type of Le Roy's religion ties in with his tendency toward subjectivism.

4: THEORY OF SOCIAL RELIGION.

A: SOCIAL NATURE OF RELIGION.

Le Roy's insistence upon the social nature of religion is probably a survival. His idea of that social nature most certainly of the origin and nature of its social character, is not.

He holds that the external, divisive elements of personality are not truly basic. All of us are in fellowship with the same God, and the deepest will in all of us is one. There is a certain solidarity of the human race, of which our religious experience is the core.

Here, it seems to me is the philosophic justification for a society of mutuality. Perhaps socialism is to succeed capitalism even as capitalism succeeded feudalism. The similarity between this concept of the social

nature of religion, and that of the old hierarchical church is merely superficial. Le Roy nowever identifies them.

B: THE CHURCH.

There is an inner contradiction in Le Roy's discussion of the Church. It is his evident desire to defend the historic Church.

He first argues the finiteness of man both in time and space. Religion needs some organ that is larger and more lasting than the individual. But humanity as a whole is such an organ. Le Roy sees this fact, and admits that in a sense, humanity is the church that we need.

However, he points out that humanity as a whole is inadequate. Humanity must be organized for religion and religious progress. Here he has hit upon the idea of the church as a free association of persons for the purpose of religion which underlies the congregational system. Le Roy himself sees that his argument is inadequate as a justification for the Church. He says that it is at least a part of humanity organized for the purpose of religion.

However, in his discussion of the social nature of religion, he seems to have hit upon the true explanation

for the existence of the historic Church, which he is so zealous to defend. He speaks of Judaism and Christianity as legacies from ancient Israel, and of religion organized upon a national basis. Is not Judaism the ghost of a former nation, Israel? And is not the historic Church the ghost of an empire, that of Rome? On this basis Churchism becomes very much the same kind of thing as nationalism.

Le Roy offers a very good explanation of man's need religiously for

a: humanity as a whole, and

b: some association for religious purposes.

For an adequate justification of the Church in a sense larger than (b), and yet smaller than (a), it would be necessary:

1: To justify a phenomenon which is common both to Churchism and Nationalism; ie, the segregation of a group from humanity as a whole, not as an end in itself. (Karl Pearson begins such a defense in his definition: "Patriotism is the acknowledgment that we owe duties to our fellowmen, and cannot adequately perform them to the human race.") It would be necessary:

2: To show that such division on a non-territorial basis as in Churchism is just as good as one upon a terri-

torial basis as in nationalism, or that at least it is not harmful. In short, the Church in this sense of the word, represents a concentration of our sympathies upon a non-territorial basis. Both the limitation of sympathy and the basis upon which it is limited must be justified in order to justify the Church.

Although Le Roy thus gives us the material for seeing the problem clearly, he does not see it so himself, to say nothing of solving it.

5: GENERAL COMMENT.

In general, Le Roy has made a marked contribution to our thought. His new ideas and methods are very stimulating. In his theoretical presentation, he tends to overstress the truth for which he stands, while in practical matters, he tends to be very conservative. These are however but minor matters. His system will undoubtedly help us to garner more truth. Furthermore, if he cannot prove God, he at least shows us that we do believe in Him.

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